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1. Introduction 
In August 2011, the Spanish Securities Market Commission (CNMV) together with three 
other European supervisors announced a precautionary ban on establishing or increasing 
short positions in financial institutions’ stocks. This exceptional measure was adopted at a 
time of heightened aggregate uncertainty and volatility in financial markets, coinciding with 
the resurgence of tensions in the sovereign debt markets of various euro area countries.  
Although that volatility spike had several roots, the direct cause seems closely linked 
to the problems of fiscal management on both sides of the Atlantic. On the one hand, delays 
in securing political agreement to raise the U.S. federal deficit ceiling fuelled the climate of 
uncertainty in financial markets worldwide. In the European markets, the spark was the 
failure of the European Council of 21 July to arrive at a clearly articulated and adequately 
funded agreement to guarantee the viability of Greece’s public finances. As in earlier phases 
of the European sovereign debt market crisis, the expectation of a restructuration of Greece’s 
public debt had a knock-on effect on other economies in the region. This time, however, the 
fallout was greater and more widely distributed than in earlier episodes. In particular, from 
the end of July 2011, a number of euro area countries like Italy, Spain, Belgium and France, 
which had safely ridden out the previous crisis episodes, began to suffer growing pressure on 
their sovereign bonds that manifested through the widening of their sovereign CDS spreads to 
then record highs. The fact that several of the region’s largest economies were pulled into the 
debt storm heightened the perception of systemic risk for the whole area.  
As it has been apparent since the initial stages of the current global financial crisis, the 
close linkages between the sovereign and the financial sector facilitated at that time the rapid 
spread of public debt market tensions to some key wholesale markets. In fact, the 
intensification of the Greek crisis, through its spillovers into other euro-area sovereign debt 
markets, soon pushed up the credit risk indicators of most European banks. 
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In this context, on 11 August 2011, the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA) published a communication calling for harmonised regulatory action on short selling 
in the EU, and emphasising the requirements of the Market Abuse Directive, which prohibits 
the dissemination of information that gives false or misleading signals as to financial 
instruments, including rumours and false or misleading news.1 By these terms, ESMA 
justified its support for the national securities authorities of Belgium, Spain, Italy and France, 
all of whom announced that same day the imminent implementation of bans on the short 
selling of financial corporations stocks. 
The CNMV, in its own communication enacting the ban, characterised the extreme 
volatility then affecting European securities markets in general, and bank sector stocks in 
particular, as posing a material threat to the stability and the orderly functioning of markets. 
Therefore, the upkeep of financial stability was the leading motive for its decision to prohibit 
temporarily short positions in the shares of 16 Spanish financial corporations. 
In this paper, we analyse some of the main implications of this ban along two key 
dimensions: financial stability, which we proxy by means of some indicators of banks’ 
default-risk, and market performance, including the impact of the ban on liquidity, stock 
prices and price discovery. In order to approximate the ban’s power to support financial 
stability, we first offer empirical evidence that shows a positive causal relation between short 
                                                        
1 The persistent rumours sweeping the markets in the days before ESMA’s communication about the supposedly 
perilous state of various European banks had particularly targeted some French institutions (see, for instance, the 
article “Panic in Paris”, in The Economist, 20 August 2011). On 10th August, Société Générale lost as much as 
20% of its stock exchange value at some points in trading before closing 15% down, while BNP Paribas and 
Crédit Agricole posted losses of 9.5% and 12%, respectively. The Banque de France had to issue a 
communication the following day underscoring the financial soundness of these institutions (available at: 
http://www.banque-france.fr/uploads/tx_bdfgrandesdates/press-release-Noyer-11-08-2011.pdf). 
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positions and the credit risk indicators of medium-sized Spanish banks in the weeks 
preceding the ban, which subsequently eased. This indicates that restricting short sales on 
these stocks had some stabilising influence on the market perception of the banks’ solvency, 
a result that is found to be insignificant for the country’s two largest banks. Indeed, following 
the inception of the ban, we document a decoupling between the default risk of the sovereign 
debt and that of the debt issued by medium-sized banks. Such a significant decoupling, that 
came hand in hand with a sizeable moderation in the path of the probability of default 
indicators of this last group of banks, is not found in either the largest banks or the non-
financials. The stabilising effect on medium-sized banks is reflected not only in their credit 
risk indicators but also in the volatility of their stock returns, which fell significantly both in 
absolute terms and in comparison with that of the large banks and the non-financial 
companies. We also document an interesting collateral effect of the ban on short sales in 
financial stocks: the short positions in non-financial companies rose significantly following 
the ban. This reflected, in part, the existence of a common market-wide risk factor that is 
present in the sovereign CDS.  
Nonetheless, the previous stabilisation effects of the ban on the credit risk indicators 
of medium-sized banks came at the cost of a significant and lasting decline in the liquidity of 
the medium-sized banks’ stocks, which also suffered a more severe decline in their exchange 
trading volumes and a slowdown in the process of price formation than the other two groups 
of firms. This suggests that the possible benefits of a restriction on short-selling, in terms of 
its potential for stabilising the financial conditions of certain firms, must be carefully weighed 
against some significant losses in the quality of market functioning. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature in order to formulate the questions pursued in the subsequent empirical analysis. 
Section 3 describes the data set. Section 4 analyses the effects of short sales on the 
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probability of default of companies listed in the Spanish market amid the sharp deterioration 
of the financial landscape in the euro area in summer 2011, and studies the effects of the ban 
on corporate credit risk. Section 5 examines the effect of the ban on the Spanish stock market 
in terms of liquidity, volatility, excess returns and price discovery. Section 6 contains some 
final remarks. 
2. Related literature 
Our paper is directly connected to two different strands of the literature on short-selling 
constraints. The first is focused on the role of these constraints as devices to maintain 
financial stability. The second is mainly concerned with the impact of short sales constraints 
on several dimensions of stock market performance, including the volatility of stock prices 
and their level, the price discovery process and liquidity. In what follows we consider how 
our analysis is shaped by and contributes to some earlier analyses within these two areas. 
Short sales constraints and financial stability 
In a context dominated by aggregate economic and financial uncertainty, an increase in short 
positions in financial stocks can be understood as a natural market response reflecting 
heightened investor pessimism. There are, in fact, several channels through which an upturn 
in aggregate risk and market volatility can dull the outlook for present and future financial 
sector earnings. For example, a decline in the value of government bond portfolios will 
typically damage banks’ balance sheets given their hefty exposure to this type of asset. Also, 
the fact that in the current financial crisis many governments are lending direct or indirect 
support to their domestic financial sector through guarantees, liquidity lines, etc. may cause 
the transmission of sovereign debt market tensions to bank stocks. Likewise, a worsening of 
the macroeconomic outlook due, for instance, to tougher financing conditions throughout the 
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economy, will tend to depress expectations for banks’ net interest income and loan book 
quality, again bearing down on stock market quotes.  
At the same time, it is conceivable that, in some circumstances, an increase in short 
positions in financial stocks could magnify the effect of any perturbations hitting the sector, 
in which case curtailing this kind of trade should, in theory, support the stability of affected 
institutions. The potential linkage between short selling of financial stocks and banking 
stability has been recently explored from a theoretical standpoint in several articles.  
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) analyse how short-selling may exacerbate 
fluctuations in assets prices, in the context of a model of fire sales under liquidity frictions. In 
particular, these authors explore the case in which short-sellers anticipate the need of one 
trader to sell an asset and, strategically, add some selling pressure on that asset upon the 
expectation of buying it back later, at a lower price. Key to the logic of the underlying 
mechanism that renders such strategies optimal is the idea that short sales may trigger an 
undershooting effect on assets prices by allowing opportunistic investors to mimic the moves 
of other traders under pressure to liquidate their investments. A direct testable implication, 
which in fact we test with our data, is that a short-selling constraint, given everything else, 
should contribute to reduce the volatility of the price of the stocks affected by it. 
Liu (2010) examines a mechanism through which short sales of a bank’s stock can 
cause its failure. At the core of this mechanism is the idea that risk-averse creditors, who 
extract information from the shares price about the firm’s underlying fundamentals, become 
increasingly unsure about the true fundamentals as the shares prices turn more volatile. Thus, 
they become less willing to maintain their exposure to the bank in question. As this happens 
at a sufficiently large scale, “too noisy” stock prices may end up triggering a bankruptcy. In 
anticipation of this, speculators find it then optimal to short-sell the stock beforehand to 
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amplify price volatility. As a result, they crowd out lenders and, therefore, increase the 
likelihood of benefitting from the firm’s collapse.2  
Venter (2011) also discusses the link between short sales and bank solvency in a 
context of equilibrium multiplicity in which different agents access asymmetric information 
sets. Specifically, he shows that under some conditions short-selling constraints may help 
avoid a run on a bank by providing the right incentives for the participation of the most active 
investors in the market, even though this entails some informational efficiency costs.  
From the previous arguments, we can take the central idea that under some 
circumstances restricting short sales on banks’ stocks may improve their financing 
conditions, by mitigating the incidence of imperfect knowledge and asymmetric information 
between the various classes of investors in a firm. We test this idea by examining the effects 
of short positions on some indicators of the default likelihood at the firm level in the months 
preceding the inception of the short-selling ban by the Spanish supervisor in August 2011, 
exploiting a wide sample of financial and non-financial companies. In particular, we take the 
CDS spreads and some model-based estimated probabilities of default as indicators of the 
firms’ degree of financial vulnerability. A key piece of information used in this analysis is the 
series of short positions exceeding 0.2% of the total capital of every firm in the Spanish 
market. Then, based on event-study techniques, we assess the effect of the short-selling ban 
on the previous indicators of financial vulnerability, distinguishing by type of firm (medium-
sized banks, large banks and non-financial firms). 
                                                        
2 Standard & Poor’s (2008) contains an interesting explanation of how this rating agency takes into account 
stock prices as signals in its credit risk assessments depending on the nature of the firm and the specific 
circumstances, arguing that under some conditions, especially in the case of confidence-sensitive companies, 
falls in stock prices may affect significantly the creditworthiness of a firm.  
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The effects of short sales constraints on market performance 
The effects of short sales on some basic dimensions of the functioning of the stock market, 
including liquidity, informational efficiency and the possibility of overvaluation, have 
received far more attention than the links between short-selling and financial stability 
described earlier. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) developed a model with heterogeneous 
investors, in which, given the costs on short sales, some cannot take on short positions. The 
setup is then exploited to analyse how short-selling constraints affect the speed of adjustment 
of stock prices and also their level. A central conclusion of the analysis is that a prohibition 
on short sales, by crowding out some traders, reduces the speed of adjustment of prices to 
private information and, as a result, average bid-ask spreads rise.  
The previous conclusion regarding the impact of short sales on liquidity and 
informational efficiency has received ample factual support in a number of recent empirical 
studies. For instance, as regards the effect of short-selling constraints on liquidity, Boehmer, 
Jones and Zhang (2011) – using stocks traded in U.S. markets – and Marsh and Payne (2012) 
– using references drawn for the U.K. market – find that restrictions on short positions 
damaged liquidity significantly, as proxied by bid-ask spreads. Beber and Pagano (2011) 
document a similar detrimental effect of shorting constraints on liquidity, exploiting a large 
panel of data from 30 countries over the period January 2008 to June 2009, when many of the 
countries enacted and lifted bans on short positions in the context of the global financial 
crisis. As regards price discovery, Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007), Saffi and Sigurdsson 
(2011), Boehmer and Wu (2012) and Pagano and Beber (2011) all find evidence suggesting 
that short sales increase the degree of informational efficiency of securities prices. 
The impact of shorting bans on the shares price level is more controversial. At the 
theoretical level, models of disagreement, à la Miller (1977), typically prescript that by 
limiting the participation of the most pessimistic traders, short sales constraints tend to bias 
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prices upwards. By contrast, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) argue that if market makers are 
risk-neutral, then prices will not be affected by the absence of short-sellers. This is because 
market makers do internalise the information that, in expectation, would be otherwise left out 
by the prohibition. This divergence of conclusions extends to the empiric front too. For 
instance, Boehmer, Jones and Zhang (2011) find little evidence that the 2008 ban on short 
sales in the U.S. caused a positive effect on prices. This finding, they argue, could reflect that 
the ban was expected to be short-lived since regulation in the US only allows the supervisor 
(the Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC) to maintain the ban for up to 30 days. Beber 
and Pagano (2011) also fail to find evidence in favour of the price-support hypothesis for 
most countries in their sample. On the other hand, Chang, Cheng and Yu (2007) find 
evidence that shorting constraints do convey an overvaluation effect in the Hong Kong 
market, which is stronger in those stocks with wider dispersion of investors’ beliefs. 
A similar lack of coincidence seems to exist around the conceivable effect of shorting 
constraint on the volatility of stock prices. For instance, while Chang, Cheng and Yu (2007) 
find that stocks subject to the ban exhibit lower volatility, Ho (1996) notes that shorting 
restrictions in Singapore in 1985 came with more volatile stocks returns. Boehmer, Jones and 
Zhang (2011) report a significant increase in returns volatility following inception of the ban 
in the U.S. in 2008, and fail to identify any significant difference between the volatility of the 
stocks subject to the ban and those unaffected by it within the ban period. 
Besides methodological differences with respect to some of the previous papers, the 
main result arising from our analysis is related to the marked divergence between the market 
performance indicators for medium-sized banks vis-à-vis large banks and non-financial firms 
following the introduction of the shorting ban. While some of these papers have identified 
differences along previous dimensions of market performance across different groups of 
firms, based on certain indicators of size or trading activity (see e.g. Bohemer et al. 2011), 
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interestingly, we find that such differences extend to every dimension analysed here 
(liquidity, returns volatility and price discovery), except relative stocks returns. In the latter 
case, we find no significant differences between the three groups considered following the 
ban on short sales of financial shares.  
Taken together, the results obtained in this paper, concerning both the effect of the 
ban on the indicators of firms’ solvency and on market performance, offer some interesting 
new insights when considered alongside previous literature. First, based on our results, we 
would argue that the “success” of a ban on short sales aimed at supporting financial stability 
should be better assessed against its power to stabilise the financial resilience of the firms 
targeted by the ban, rather than merely on the basis of its effect on relative stock prices. 
Second, the recent experience in the Spanish stock market reveals in a neat way the existence 
of a trade-off between the effectiveness and the efficiency costs of a short-selling constraint, 
in the sense that the higher power of the ban to support the financial strength of a subset of 
banks unleashed important damages in the liquidity, volume of trading and price discovery of 
their stocks. 
3. Data 
We exploit daily information on the stock of short positions and stocks lending of shares 
trading on the Spanish continuous market (SIBE) from March 2011 to December 2011. These 
series come from a proprietary CNMV data set. Regarding the stock of short positions, 
investors are obliged to notify the authorities of any net short position exceeding 0.2% of the 
issued share capital of the company concerned and each 0.1% above that.3 Further, the 
                                                        
3 Uncovered short positions, in which the seller has not ensured the availability of the securities, are prohibited 
in Spain. 
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threshold for public disclosure of net short positions is set at 0.5% and each 0.1% above that, 
thus the information is available to all market participants. 
The data on CDS spreads of the sovereign CDS and the Spanish corporations are 
obtained from Credit Market Analysis (CMA). This information is available for only 18 of 
the Spanish firms in the continuous stock market. The data are employed as indicators of the 
corporate risk premiums. CDS spreads are also used to compute the spillovers in credit risk 
between the sovereign and the financial sectors in Section 4. Due to the lack of CDS for most 
of the firms forming the Spanish market, we use alternatively default probabilities and 
implied ratings that are obtained from the StarMine Structural Credit Risk model through 
Reuters platform. Based on the input provided by equity market participants, this model 
produces an estimate of the probability that a company will go bankrupt or default on its debt 
obligations over the next one-year period. 
The information on daily stocks prices, including the bid and ask prices, and the trade 
volume are obtained from Datastream. The information on the index Ibex 35, the EuroStoxx 
50 and the volatility indexes VIX and VSTOXX also come from Datastream. Finally, the 
information regarding the European Central Bank (ECB) bond purchases was obtained from 
the ECB webpage. 
4. The effects of the ban on the credit risk of financial institutions 
Towards the end of July 2011, the financial markets in some major western jurisdictions 
suffered a new episode of heightened instability. As shown in figure 1 (left-hand panel), the 
scale of the turbulences was especially apparent in the volatility surge that gripped the 
world’s leading stock markets, with the Spanish market no less affected. At the same time, 
many European banks suffered a sharp run-down in their shares prices (see figure 1, right-
hand panel). 
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< Insert Figure 1 here> 
The panels in figure 2 show that the surge in financial sector risk coincided with a jump in the 
indicators of the risk-contagion effect running from the sovereign to the financial sector in 
Italy and Spain, precisely at a time when the two countries’ sovereign risk indicators were 
deteriorating at a very fast rate.4 This last effect added to the deterioration of quality of the 
non-sovereign assets held by many European banks, putting further pressure on their capital 
ratios, hampering their access to financing and, thus, increasing the vulnerability of this 
systemically important sector which is, by nature, keenly sensitive to changes in investor 
sentiment. 
< Insert Figure 2 here> 
In the remainder of this section, we first analyse the impact of accumulated short positions on 
the several credit risk indicators of the companies listed in the Spanish market (section 4.1) 
and then provide some estimates of the effect of the ban on those indicators and also on the 
strength of the sovereign-corporate risk-contagion effect (section 4.2). The idea in the last 
case is to assess the extent to which the ban on short sales was effective in isolating the 
financial companies from the dominant aggregate source of risk at that time, i.e. sovereign 
risk. 
4.1 Short positions and credit risk 
We next construct an empirical model aimed at identifying the effect of short positions 
(relative to the share capital) on the CDS of the three groups of firms considered (medium-
sized banks, large banks and non-financial companies) before the ban that allows us to 
                                                        
4 The details about the estimation of the contagion (spillover) effects can be found in the Appendix. 
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control for a number of potential explanatory factors of the credit risk of each group.5,6 
Specifically, besides the volume of short positions, the regression also includes controls as 
possible additional explanatory factors for the changes in the CDS spreads, the changes in the 
CDS liquidity, the lagged stock returns, a measure for the stock return volatility lagged one 
day, lagged changes in the VIX index, changes in the Spanish sovereign CDS lagged one day 
and changes in the level of CDS spreads lagged one period. 
We also take into account that some days before the ban, and with effect from 8 
August onwards, the European Central Bank (ECB) issued a communication welcoming the 
new measures and reforms announced by the Italian and Spanish governments. In the same 
text, the ECB also restated its availability to implement actively its Securities Markets 
Programme (SMP). Under this programme, designed to support the orderly functioning of 
key financial markets, the ECB is authorised to make purchases of euro-area sovereign bonds 
in the secondary market. This declaration may have had a calming effect on the sovereign 
risk and, indirectly, on the private sector risk too. 
To study the incremental effect of the short positions before the ban for the different 
types of firms, we include an interaction variable which is obtained as the product of the short 
positions in each firm lagged one period and two dummy variables: one dummy for the three 
                                                        
5 The two largest banks are Santander and BBVA. Excluded from the sample are short positions in the shares of 
non-banking financial corporations affected by the ban (Grupo Catalana Occidente, Mapfre, Bolsas y Mercados 
Españoles, Renta 4 Servicios de Inversión and Caja de Ahorros del Mediterráneo).   
6 We use the information refereed to the short-positions related variables in levels because we are interested in 
both the trend and the level of the variables. We did three panel unit root tests – Levin, Lin, Chu’s (2002) test, 
Modified Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Taylor and Sarno, 1998) and Fisher-ADF type unit root test (Maddala 
and Wu, 1999) - and find no evidence of unit root in the panel data. Note also that short-positionsn variables are 
defined as a ratio and so, their values are between zero and one. 
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types of firms and another that takes the value of one before the ban (March 2011–August 
2011) and zero otherwise. The sample period spans from March 2011 to December 2011. The 
coefficients for the effects of the previous variables are estimated on the basis of a fixed-
effects regression with the standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional 
correlation. The results are reported in column 1 of table 1.  
From these results we can single out that before the ban, the volume of short positions 
in medium-sized banks acted as a significant determinant of changes in their average CDS, 
such that the greater the volume of short positions, the higher the level of this credit risk 
indicator. In particular, an increase of one percentage point in the stock of short positions in 
medium-sized banks’ shares relative to their capital before the ban leads, on average, to a rise 
of around 4.5 basis points in their CDS spreads over and above the effect of other risk 
factors.7 By way of contrast, the pre-ban volume of short positions over the capital of the 
other two groups of firms does not seem to cause significant changes in their CDS. 
In the case of the control variables considered, the direction of the effect is as 
expected. In particular, changes in the sovereign CDS spreads and the VIX index have a 
significant positive effect on average changes in the CDS of listed companies, albeit rather 
more weakly in the case of the VIX index, which we include as a global indicator of market 
volatility. As expected, increases in the CDS bid-ask spread, which signal a lower liquidity of 
the CDS contracts, have a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable. 
Conversely, increases in the average firm’s stock returns of the previous trading session have 
a significant negative effect on the firm’s CDS. This last result points towards the relatively 
high information content of share prices regarding company financial soundness in a sample 
period as convulsive as the one in question. We also note the negative effect, although non-
                                                        
7 This is the sum of first and third coefficients in column 1 of table 1. 
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significant, from the lagged changes in the CDS spreads, whose scale, extremely low in 
absolute terms, reveals the persistent nature of this variable’s deviations from its long-term 
average. 
Finally, the ECB’s purchases of government bonds in the secondary market have a 
negative effect on CDS, as expected, but this effect is not significant. This lack of 
significance of the ECB purchases of debt after 8th August 2012 could be due to their 
seemingly short-lived impact of this announcement on the Spanish sovereign debt risk, 
arguably the variable that should have reacted more directly to that announcement. Indeed, as 
shown in figure 3 the Spanish sovereign surged again a few days after a sharp fall following 
the announcement. More formally, we regress the first difference of the sovereign CDS 
spread on a dummy variable that takes the value of one during the one and a half month after 
8th August and zero during the same period before that date, and we find a non-significant 
effect of the dummy coefficient at any standard level of significance. Hence, we interpret the 
absence of a significant effect of the ECB’s announcement on the Spanish sovereign CDS as 
the most plausible explanation for its low impact on the indicators of credit risk of the 
Spanish listed firms found in the estimates of table 1. 
< Insert Figure 3 here > 
The second column of table 1 reports the incremental effects on the CDS spreads for 
the three groups of firms before the ban. The new interaction variables are not multiplied by 
the short positions and so it enables us to test whether the rise in the levels of the CDS 
spreads before the ban was mainly due to any other distinctive group feature such that the 
surge in the CDS of medium-sized banks could have taken place independently of the short 
positions taken on these banks. Thus, we check whether the dummy for medium-sized banks 
is significantly different from zero before the ban. If that were the case, then short positions 
may not contain valuable additional information as determinants of the firms’ credit risk. 
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However, results show that this interaction variable is not significant, which suggests that the 
stock of short positions does add informational value to explain the credit risk of medium-
sized institutions. The remaining controls have a similar magnitude and degree of 
significance as the ones reported in column 1. 
We next test the robustness of the previous results by exploiting the volume of stocks 
lending instead of that of short positions reported to the supervisor, as a proxy of short sales 
activity. The third column of table 1 reports the effect of the stocks lending relative to total 
capital and its incremental effect before the ban.8 As in the baseline, we find that before the 
ban, the adjusted volume of stocks lending for the case of medium-sized banks was a 
significant driver of the changes in their CDS, while this was not the case for the other two 
groups of firms. The R-square and the magnitude and significance of the controls are similar 
to those obtained in the baseline estimation reported in the first column of table 1. 
< Insert Table 1 here > 
To gain greater focus on the impact of short positions on the firms’ CDS over time, 
we next estimate the incremental effect of the short positions one, two, three and four months 
before the ban for the three groups of firms. The new interaction variables for each type of 
firm are obtained as the product of dummies that take the value of one for the corresponding 
number of months before the ban (one, two, three, or four) and the short positions lagged one 
period. The estimated effects of short positions for the one up to four months dummy 
                                                        
8 The volume of lent shares is typically influenced by dividend payments, increasing significantly before the 
date of the dividend and converging later on to the previous level. To control for this, we filter the variable by 
regressing it on a dummy that takes the value of one ten days before and after the dividend payment date and on 
a time dummy. We then use the residuals and the constant of this filtering regression to construct the 
explanatory variables referred to the securities lending activity that are used in the regression whose results are 
reported in column 3 of table 1. 
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variables are contained in columns 2 to 5 of table 2, respectively (the first column 
corresponds to the baseline reported in column 1 of table 1). These estimates reveal that the 
volume of short positions in medium-sized banks was affecting significantly their average 
CDS not just the weeks before the ban, when risk indicators heightened as shown before, but 
up to four months before. However, not surprisingly, the strongest effect of short-selling 
activity on the CDS of the medium-sized banks took place in the last two months prior to the 
ban. Specifically, an increase of 1% in the level of short positions in medium-sized banks’ 
shares relative to their capital during one and two months before the ban leads to an average 
incremental rise of two basis points (third coefficient in columns 2 and 3 of table 2) in their 
CDS spreads over and above the effect of other risk factors. Again, this last effect is not 
significant for the non-financial corporations and the largest banks in any of the four months 
preceding the ban. 
< Insert Table 2 here > 
The availability of CDS data for the firms in the Spanish stock market limits the previous 
analysis to 17 single-names,9 although these firms represent most of the trading volume in the 
Spanish stock market. Specifically, on average, they represent almost 80% of the total daily 
volume of trade over the sample period. To enlarge the number of firms in our analysis, we 
next exploit data on default probabilities and implied ratings of the listed companies, obtained 
from StarMine, instead of CDS spreads. This enables us to extend our analysis to 105 firms 
for which such information exists (out of 135 firms in the market), that together account for 
93% of the total daily trading volume, on average.10  
                                                        
9 CDS prices are available for 18 firms, but bid and ask CDS prices are not available for Banesto. 
10 Based on market sources, the StarMine Structural Credit Risk model evaluates the probability that a company 
will default on its debt obligations over the next one-year period. This model is an extension of the structural 
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The default probabilities (dp) series are logit transformed as in Altman and Rijken 
(2004), according to the formula ln(dp/(1-dp)). We use the first difference of the transformed 
default probabilities as the dependent variable to be consistent with the previous baseline 
regression analysis. 
The results, reported in column 1 of table 3, confirm that before the ban, short 
positions in medium-sized banks had a positive and significant effect on the changes of 
default probabilities. An increase of 1% in the level of short positions in medium-sized 
banks’ shares relative to their capital during the months before the ban would lead to an 
average incremental percentage change of around 0.25% in their logit transformed default 
probabilities (around 0.56% in the non-transformed default probability) over and above the 
effect of global, sovereign and idiosyncratic risks. Additionally, we find a positive and 
significant effect of short positions in the other financial firms on their default probabilities. 
This result reinforces the one obtained for the medium-sized banks as the last group of 
institutions consists of relatively small firms, as compared with the big firms included in the 
Ibex 35. We do not find any significant effect for the other two groups of firms considered 
(big banks and non-financials). The negative and low scale, in absolute terms, of the effect 
from the lagged changes in default probabilities reveals the persistent nature of this variable’s 
deviations from its long-term average. As in the case in which we use the change in CDS as 
the dependent variable, we find positive and significant effects of the changes in the VIX 
                                                                                                                                                                            
default prediction framework introduced by Robert Merton and uses the equity market value, its volatility and 
liability structure. For this reason, we do not use the information referring to the equity market value of equity 
and volatility in our regression. We also exclude the change of the CDS from the set of regressors. As the ban 
affected not only big and medium-sized banks, but also other financials (insurance and financial services firms) 
that are now included in the sample, we also control for the short positions (lagged one period) on them before 
the ban. The standard errors are clustered by firm to produce unbiased errors. 
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Index and the Spanish sovereign CDS, thus, suggesting that default probabilities were also 
being positively affected by global uncertainty and risk. 
Besides the first difference in default probabilities, we use the first difference in the 
implied ratings reported by StarMine. In particular, we assign value of 1 to rating category 
AAA and so successively until the last rating category in our sample, which is CC and takes a 
value of 21. The use of first differences means that an upgrade in the rating category will take 
value +1, while a downgrade will take value -1. As this implies that we are imposing a linear 
relation in the rating values, we repeat the analysis using two transformations of the rating 
category. First, we assign values that increase in one unit for the investment grade category 
and two units for the junk grade category. Thus, we assign values from 1 to 10 to ratings 
ranging from AAA to BBB- and from 12 to 32 for the ratings ranging from BB+ to CC. This 
implies that upgrades or downgrades in the investment grade (junk grade) category are 
assigned values of +1 or -1 (+2 or -2), respectively. Second, we assign value 1 for the ratings 
in the investment grade category and ratings ranging from 2 to 12 for the BB+ to CC in the 
junk grade category. That is, the dependent variable will take value 0 independently of the 
existence of downgrades or upgrades in the investment grade category and +1 or -1 
depending on whether there is a downgrade or upgrade in the junk category. The estimation is 
performed for the top 50 firms with information on their implied ratings. The results for these 
three variations of the dependent variable based on the implied rating are reported in columns 
2 to 4 of table 3. Results are consistent with those reported in column 1. In particular, an 
increase of 1% in the level of short positions in medium-sized banks relative to their capital 
before the ban would raise the probability of a downgrade by almost 60%.  
< Insert Table 3 here > 
The results of this last exercise support and, in some cases, refine and supplement the main 
arguments and observations put forward earlier. Specifically, the evidence supports the 
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presence of a singular effect on the perceived credit risk of medium-sized Spanish banks in 
response to the aggregate macro-financial turmoil unleashed in July 2011. Furthermore, such 
an effect is found to be very robust to alternative measurement strategies. 
4.2 The effect of the ban on credit risk 
A first notable observation is that the average spreads of CDS of the medium-sized banks 
eased appreciably following the ban, after several weeks of sustained increases (see figure 4). 
In effect, although their CDS continued trading higher than those of larger banks and non-
financial listed companies, their trend clearly stabilised after the ban. Indeed, the CDS 
spreads of both sets of financial institutions headed lower in the first few weeks after the ban, 
while those of non-financial corporations went on accelerating for some weeks more. 
< Insert Figure 4 here > 
Indicators of spillover effects between the CDS of Spanish government bonds and 
those of the previous three groups of firms elucidate this incremental easing of medium-sized 
bank CDS in the wake of the ban. In particular, from figure 3 it can be seen that while the 
sovereign CDS headed higher with some interruptions until November, risk contagion from 
the sovereign to the medium-sized bank wore off appreciably once restrictions on short sales 
began. The indicator of contagion had been growing in intensity since approximately one 
month before, driving the CDS of medium-sized banks sharply higher in the intervening 
period. Conversely, the contagion from government bonds to the largest banks, which had 
likewise intensified a few weeks earlier, appeared largely unaffected by the ban and the same 
was true of the group of non-financial corporations. 
In order to test statistically the hypothesis about the stabilising power of the ban, we 
next perform an estimation based on an event-study methodology of the behaviour of the 
CDS and the indicators of sovereign-corporate risk contagion for the three groups of firms 
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before and after the ban. A first important question concerns the length of the sample period. 
The net impact of short-selling bans may be clouded by the inclusion of observations that are 
far away from the inception date of the ban. Based on this reflection, we assess the impact of 
the ban by using information over a three-month period, centred on the date of its inception. 
Specifically, we regress the first difference of the indicator of sovereign-corporate risk 
contagion on three firm-group dummies that take the value of one during the post-ban period 
(one month and a half after the ban) and zero during the pre-ban period (one month and a half 
before the ban). We then run a similar regression replacing the contagion indicator by the first 
difference in the spreads of the corporate CDS as the dependent variable. The estimates are 
obtained using OLS with robust standard errors and controlling by time and firm fixed 
effects. 
Panel A of table 4 reports the coefficients of this estimation, while panel B contains 
the estimated differences between these coefficients, indicating whether the incremental 
effect of the ban for the different firm groups is significantly different from zero. The null 
hypothesis to test in panel B is whether the effects of the ban on the changes of the indicator 
of contagion and the CDS spreads for the first firm in the cells of the first column are stronger 
(more negative coefficients) than the effect for the second firm. 
< Insert Table 4 here > 
The main result of the first regression (column 1 of panel A) is that after the ban there 
was a significant (at a 5% significance level) decrease in the credit risk contagion indicator 
running from the sovereign to the group of medium-sized banks. This effect is also negative, 
but not significant, for the largest banks and positive, not significant either, for non-
financials. The figures show that the average decrease of the daily variation in the sovereign 
risk contagion indicator corresponding to the medium-sized banks following the ban was 
around 1.5 percentage points. The comparison of the changes in the contagion indicator 
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spillovers after the ban for the medium-sized banks with respect to the other two firm groups 
reveals that the fall in the intensity of the contagion effect was significantly higher in the first 
firm group than in the other two (see column 1 of panel B). Thus, these estimates corroborate 
the intuition outlined before coming from the visual inspection of figure 3.  
Regarding the effect of the ban on the CDS spreads, we find a negative impact for the 
three types of firms (see column 2 of panel A), which is, however, only significant (at a 5% 
confidence level) in the case of the medium-sized banks. The average decrease of the daily 
change in the CDS spreads of medium-sized banks after the inception of the ban was around 
10 basis points. This decrease is found to be significantly higher, in absolute terms, than the 
ones observed for large banks and non-financial firms (see column 2 of panel B). 
We finally analyse the effect of the ban on the short positions in non-financial firms, 
i.e. those not directly targeted by this measure. To this aim, we perform some additional 
exercises using information on short positions one quarter around the inception date.11 First, 
we regress the first difference in the short positions of non-financial firms on a dummy that 
takes the value of one during the post-ban period to find a positive and significant (at a 5% 
significance level) difference, or around 0.004 percentage points in the ratio of short positions 
over capital ratio, between short positions after and before the ban. Given that there are no 
short positions in many of the non-financial firms in the sample, we next restrict our sample 
to the firms for which there are short positions. In this subsample, the previous positive 
differential effect rises up to 0.01 percentage points.  
The previous results suggest the existence of a shift-effect in short positions that were 
initially built up on the capital of financial entities to non-financial companies following the 
                                                        
11 The estimates are obtained using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust standard errors and including 
fixed effects for each firm and day effects. 
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ban on the former. Such a substitution effect could be consistent with the idea that, to some 
extent, there was common underlying source of pessimism of short-sellers affecting both 
financial and non-financial firms. According to this view, short positions in companies of 
either group would be seen somewhat as substitutes, as a bet against such a common 
aggregate risk factor. A natural candidate to proxy the latter is the sovereign risk. Hence, we 
next check whether there was a stronger increase in short-selling activity for certain types of 
non-financial firms according to their exposure to sovereign credit risk. With this goal in 
mind, we split the previous dummy into two variables depending on whether the contagion 
indicator is above or below the median level of the non-financial firms during the quarter 
around the time of the ban. The corresponding regression reveals that the variation in short 
positions is larger (almost twice) in the firms that were more exposed to the sovereign risk. 
Actually, the dummy for the firms below the median level of contagion is not significant, 
while the one for the firms above the median level of contagion is significant at any standard 
level of significance. In particular, the average change in the levels of short positions in the 
subset of non-financial companies more heavily exposed to the sovereign risk increased by 
0.012 percentage points after the ban. 
From the previous results we learn that the ban on short-selling seemed to have 
unleashed a singular stabilising effect on the CDS of medium-sized banks that would have 
taken place by partially isolating these banks from the pressure coming from the public debt 
market. Similar qualitative results are found for the case of the two largest Spanish banks, 
although the economic and statistical significance of the previous stabilising effect is 
significantly weaker than in the case of the smaller banks. 
5. Market performance under the short-selling ban 
In this section we supplement our previous analysis of the effects of the ban on short- selling 
by providing some estimates of the impact of this measure on several dimensions of market 
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performance, including liquidity, trading volume, returns volatility, price discovery and 
excess returns. As a benchmark against which to assess the impact of the ban on the previous 
variables, we take the group of companies included in the Ibex 35 that were not subject to the 
ban. As in section 4.2, we exploit information from three months centred on the inception 
date (except for the case of cumulative returns). 
The panels of figure 5 contain the proxies used to capture the several market variables 
of interest. To test for the statistical significance of the patterns shown therein, we perform 
several event-study regressions. In particular, we regress the proxies for volatility, liquidity, 
volume and returns on three dummies that refer to three different groups of firms considered 
(large banks, medium-sized banks and non-financial firms included in the Ibex 35). These 
dummies take the value of one during the post-ban period and zero during the pre-ban period 
(i.e. one month and a half after the ban in each case). These estimates are obtained using OLS 
with robust standard errors and including fixed effects for each firm and day effects. The 
coefficients of this estimation are shown in panel A of table 5, while panel B reports the 
differences for such coefficients and the signs that indicate whether the incremental effect of 
the ban is significantly different from zero. The null hypothesis to test in panel B in the case 
of volatility and volume (relative bid-ask spreads and returns) is whether the effect of the ban 
obtained for the first firm in each cell of column 1 is significantly higher (lower) than the 
effect for the second firm in the cell.  
< Insert Figure 5 here > 
< Insert Table 5 here > 
Returns. The first apparent effect of the ban is the outperformance of financial corporations’ 
shares relative to those of non-financial firms included in the Ibex 35, in terms of the 
accumulated returns from the date of the ban (see top-left panel of figure 5). Also, prices 
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seem to react differently depending on the size of the banks in the sample, with a longer-lived 
boost effect in the case of the medium-sized banks (see top left panel of figure 5). However, 
in any of the cases the positive effect was temporary and had faded considerably around two 
weeks after the inception of the ban. Furthermore, as revealed by the differences-in-
differences estimates contained in panel B of table 5, the hypothesis that the ban had a 
significantly stronger effect on the banks, independently of their size, than on the non-
financial firms can be rejected at a 1% significance level. This result echoes those of Beber 
and Pagano (2011) and Boehmer, Jones and Zhang (2011), who fail to find a significant 
distinctive effect of short-selling constraints on the price of the stocks affected by them vis-à-
vis other stocks unaffected.   
Volatility. The disparity found in the preceding section in terms of the unequal impact of the 
ban on the various indicators of default risk between large and medium-sized banks carries 
over in terms of their volatility. Specifically, while the average relative returns volatility of 
the two largest banks was apparently unaffected, that of medium-sized banks died down 
considerably. As illustrated in the top right panel of figure 5, the ban had a strongly 
moderating impact on the price fluctuations of medium-sized banks’ shares, whose volatility 
readings dropped below those of the companies in the Ibex 35 not covered by the ban. 
Conversely, the relative volatility of the largest cap banks showed little variation. In fact, it 
increased two weeks after the ban and reached higher levels than those observed around the 
inception of the ban one month after this date. The estimates in column 1 of panel A in table 
5 show that following the ban there was a significant decrease in the volatility of the returns 
of the medium-sized banks, that was also perceived in the non-financial firms but not in the 
largest banks. The estimates in column 1 of panel B in table 5 confirm that the ban 
contributed to dampen significantly the fluctuations in the returns of medium-sized banks 
relative to the other two groups of firms considered. 
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Liquidity. One of the most visible consequences of the ban was the intense worsening of the 
liquidity conditions of medium-sized banks. Specifically, the bid/ask spreads of firms in this 
group widened persistently after the onset of the ban compared with those of non-financial 
Ibex 35 members (see lower left panel of figure 5). Concretely, the ban led to an average 
increase of around 0.17% and 0.04% of the relative bid-ask spread of the medium-sized 
banks and non-banned firms, respectively. In the case of the medium-sized banks, the average 
relative bid-ask spread was 0.336% at the end of June 2011 (i.e. at the beginning of the 
sample period) and so, the increase following the ban was around 50% of the level prevailing 
well before the ban. When compared with the other two groups, the previous drop in liquidity 
was statistically significant at a 1% confidence level (see panel B of table 5). 
Trading volume. The previous fall in the liquidity of the shares of medium-sized banks seems 
linked to a slump in these stocks’ trading volumes, which fell to nearly 70% in the weeks 
following the ban relative to the flow of trades at the time of its inception (see lower right 
panel of figure 5).12 The maximum drop in trading volumes from immediate pre-ban levels 
was just over 40% in the case of the banking majors and 20% among non-financial 
corporations. These post-ban differences in trading volumes between firm groups were 
statistically significant (see panel B of table 5). 
Price discovery. In tune with their deteriorating liquidity and trading conditions, the speed of 
the price adjustment of medium-sized bank stocks was curtailed following the entry of the 
ban. To estimate this effect, we calculate the speed of share price adjustment as the average 
                                                        
12 The average value of the standardised turnover volume in medium-sized banks in the quarter around the time 
of the ban was 0.9 units; being equal to 1.25 units before the inception of the ban and 0.60 after it. Nevertheless, 
the variation in the volume of the medium-sized banks shares was remarkable in the two previous periods. The 
volatility and the maximum value for the indexed volume were 2.35 and 30.73 (0.94 and 10.42) units, 
respectively, before (after) the short sales constraint. 
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difference (in percentage) between the first-order correlations of the component of daily share 
returns that is not explained by overall market performance before and after the start of the 
ban. Concretely, we compare the first-order correlations for the 35 trading days before and 
after the ban. Thus, a positive value indicates deterioration in the price discovery process in 
each category. In the case of medium-sized banks the percentage change in the speed of share 
price adjustment after the ban is 8.4%. In the case of the largest banks and non-financial 
corporations, the apparent loss of price information efficiency was considerably less severe. 
The percentage change in the speed of share price adjustment was 1.6% and 2.4% for the 
large banks and the non-financial corporations, respectively. Thus, beyond these differences 
across firm groups, we find support for the hypothesis that short sales constraints hinder price 
discovery, which is a common result in the previous empirical studies on this issue. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analysed the main effects of the short sales ban implemented in August 2011 in 
the Spanish stock market along two dimensions: financial stability and market performance.  
As regards the stabilising effects of the ban, we found that short positions were a 
significant determinant of the spreads of the CDS of medium-sized banks before the ban. 
Subsequently, by weakening the contagion effect coming from the sovereign risk, the ban 
helped stabilise the probability of default of this group of banks. By way of contrast, we 
failed to find evidence of a significant effect of short sales on the indicators of credit risk for 
the case of the largest banks and the non-financial firms listed in the Spanish market before 
the ban. Likewise, the ban did not convey a significant stabilising effect on the credit risk 
indicators of the largest banks. An interesting finding is that following the ban on short sales 
in financial stocks the short positions in non-financial companies rose significantly, which 
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reflected the presence of a common market-wide risk factor that is embedded in the sovereign 
CDS.  
Interestingly, the previous asymmetry regarding the effect of the ban on the credit risk 
indicators of the different firm groups does not extend to the case of stocks returns, in the 
sense that the ban did not give rise to significant differences in the returns of the shares 
between the medium-sized banks, the large banks and the non-financial companies. Based on 
these findings, we argue that the effectiveness of a ban on short sales aimed at supporting 
financial stability should be better assessed against its power to stabilise the financial 
resilience of the firms targeted by the ban (proxied here through their CDS spreads), rather 
than merely on the basis of its effect on relative stock prices. 
Nonetheless, the previous stabilising power of the ban came at the cost of a significant 
decline in the liquidity, trading volumes and price information efficiency of medium-sized 
banks’ stocks. In short, such deterioration was significantly more intense than the one caused 
in the rest of the stocks. This last result suggests a trade-off between the effectiveness and the 
efficiency costs of this short-selling constraint, in the sense that the power of the ban to 
support the financial strength of a subset of banks unleashed important damages in the 
liquidity, volume of trading and price discovery of their stocks. 
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Appendix 
The spillover or contagion effects are obtained from a variance decomposition associated 
with an N-variable vector autoregression (VAR) following the methodology employed in 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). These authors measure directional spillovers in a generalised 
VAR framework that eliminates the possible dependencies of results on ordering. In 
particular, we first consider a covariance stationary N-variable VAR (p): 
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covariance matrix of the error term in equation (A.1), tε . 
We rely on variance decomposition of the moving-average coefficients, which allows 
us to parse the forecast error variances of each variable into parts attributable to the various 
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system shocks.13 By means of this decomposition we can obtain the proportion of the H-step-
ahead error variance in forecasting Xi that is due to shocks to Xj, ,ij ≠∀  for each i. 
We first compute the variance shares which are defined as the fractions of the H-step-
ahead error variances in forecasting Xi due to shocks to Xi, for i= 1, 2,…, N, and cross 
variance shares, or spillovers as the fractions of the H-step-ahead error variances in 
forecasting Xi due to shocks to Xj, for i, j = 1, 2, …, N such that .ji ≠  The H-step-ahead 
forecast error variance decompositions are denoted by )(Hgijθ , for H = 1, 2, …: 
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whereΣ  is the variance matrix for the error vector ,ε iiσ  is the standard deviation of the error 
term for the ith equation and ei is the selection vector with one as the ith element and zeros 
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This methodology is used to estimate the spillovers between the sovereign and the corporate 
CDS spreads. The spillovers show the degree of variation in the changes of the corporate 
(sovereign) CDS spreads, which is not due to the historical information of the changes in the 
                                                        
13 The variance decomposition requires orthogonal innovations, but the VAR innovations are generally 
contemporaneously correlated. The use of the generalised VAR instead of the Cholesky factorisation avoids 
using arbitrary ordering assumptions.  
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sovereign and the corporate CDS spreads but to shocks (innovations) in the changes of the 
sovereign (corporate) CDS spreads. This indicator takes higher values as the intensity of the 
contagion effect, caused by the specific shocks of the corporate (sovereign) CDS premium 
increases. In the extreme case in which there are no spillovers from one CDS premium to the 
other, the indicator series is equal to zero. 
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Figure 1: Performance of stock markets in the United States and the euro area1  
                       Volatility2   Euro Stoxx 50 standardised indexes  
 
(1) The vertical line marks the start date of the short-selling ban in Spain (12 August 2011).  
(2) Five-trading days moving average. 
 
 
Figure 2: Banks CDS and contagion between sovereign and financial risk1 
                           Banks CDS          Sovereign-financial contagion2 
 
(1) The vertical line marks the start date of the short-selling ban in Spain (12 August 2011). 
(2) The figure shows the difference between the net percentage change in banking sector CDS index (see below) 
that is not attributable to their historical information but to contemporaneous shocks in sovereign credit risk, and 
the net change in the opposite direction. The indicator is positive when the impact of sovereign risk shocks on 
financial risk indicators is higher than vice versa. The banking sector CDS index of each country responds to the 
average of the CDS of its banks. The spillover on a given date is calculated from available data for the 60 
preceding days. In addition, the series are filtered with a 30-day moving average. See Appendix for further 
details on the methodology. 
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Figure 3: Sovereign risk contagion in Spain1,2  
 
(1) The vertical line marks the date the ban was introduced in Spain (12 August 2011).  
(2) The figure shows the difference between the net percentage change in the CDS of the three groups of firms 
that is not attributable to their historical information but to contemporaneous shocks in sovereign credit risk, and 
the net change in the opposite direction. The indicator is positive when the impact of sovereign risk shocks on 
companies risk indicators is higher than vice versa. The CDS index for each of the three groups of companies is 
obtained as the average of the CDS spreads of the firms in each group. The contagion indicator on a given date 
is calculated from available data for the 60 preceding days. In addition, the series is filtered with a 30-day 
moving average. See Appendix for further details on the methodology. 
 
Figure 4: CDS spreads of Spanish listed companies1 
 
(1) The vertical line marks the start date of the short-selling ban in Spain (12 August 2011). 
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Figure 5: Liquidity, trading volume, volatility and stock prices1 
                  Relative excess returns2,3                   Relative volatility2,4 
 
                 Relative bid/ask spread2,5                           Normalised trading volume6 
 
(1) The X-axis is a time scale in which 0 marks the start date of the prohibition. 
(2) Relative to the set of companies in the Ibex 35 not subject to the ban. 
(3) The relative excess return of each group on each date is the average of the cumulative spread to that date in 
the daily returns of component corporations versus the average return of the Ibex 35. 
(4) The volatility of each group on each date is calculated by reference to the average standard deviation of the 
share returns of component corporations in the preceding 22 trading days. 
(5) Bid/ask spreads are calculated for each group as the average ratio of the bid/ask spreads of the share prices 
of component corporations to the average bid/ask spread of the group. Series are also filtered with the moving 
average of the last five trading sessions. 
(6) This indicator represents the cumulative sum of the 22 previous average daily trading volumes of the shares 
of firms in each group as normalised to 100 at the time of the ban. 
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Table 1: Effect of short positions on the CDS of Spanish listed companies before the ban 
This table reports the effects of the short positions in the Spanish listed companies on the changes in their CDS 
by the type of firm (medium-sized banks, large banks and non-financials) before the ban (1 March 2011–11 
August 2011). The coefficients for the effects of the volume of short positions and the additional controls are 
estimated on the basis of a fixed effects regression with the standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and 
cross-sectional correlation. The first column reports the effect of the short positions relative to capital and their 
incremental effect before the ban for each firm group. The second column reports the differential effects for the 
three firm groups for the period before the ban without being interacted with the short positions. The third 
column reports the effect of the volume of stocks lending relative to capital and their incremental effect before 
the ban. All the variables are defined in percentages with the exception of the debt purchased by the ECB which 
is defined in billions of euros. ** and * indicate whether the coefficients are significant at a significance level of 
1% and 5%, respectively. Standard errors are reported between brackets. 
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Dependent variable: ΔCDS(t) (1) (2) (3)
0.028* 0.037**
(0.01) (0.01)
0.005*
(0.00)
0.003
(0.01)
-0.0001
(0.00)
-0.001
(0.00)
0.017**
(0.01)
0.001
(0.00)
0.003*
(0.00)
-0.203
(0.19)
-0.0001
(0.00)
-0.001
(0.00)
-0.101 -0.103 -0.101
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
-0.006* -0.006* -0.007*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.008* 0.008* 0.008*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.253** 0.255** 0.252**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
-1.45E-06 -1.37E-06 -9.52E-07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 3,767 3,767 3,547
Number of companies 17 17 17
Adj. R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.11
Short positions (t-1), total sample
Dummy medium-sized banks before ban
Short positions (t-1), medium-sized banks before ban
Stocks lending (t-1), non-financials before the ban
Dummy non-financials before the ban 
Short positions (t-1), non-financials before ban
Stocks lending (t-1)
Stocks lending (t-1), medium-sized banks before ban
Constant
ΔCDS bid-ask spread
ECB Bond purchases since 8 August 2011
ΔSpanish sovereign CDS (t-1)
ΔVIX (t-1)
Squared of stock returns (t-1)
Stock returns (t-1)
ΔCDS (t-1)
Stocks lending (t-1), large banks before ban
Dummy large banks before ban
Short positions (t-1), large banks before ban
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Table 2: Effect of short positions on the CDS of Spanish listed companies several months before the inception of the ban 
This table reports the effects of short positions in the Spanish listed companies on the changes in their CDS distinguishing by the type of firm (medium-sized banks, large 
banks and non-financials) and the number of months before the ban (from one to four months). The coefficients for the effects of the short positions and the additional 
controls are estimated on the basis of a fixed effects regression with the standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation. Column 1 (Baseline) 
reports the results for the regression in column 1 of table 1. Columns 2 to 5 report the incremental effect on short sales during the last month (second column), two months 
(third column), three months (fourth column) and four months (fifth column) before the ban. All the variables in the table are in percentages. ** and * indicate whether the 
coefficients are significant at a significance level of 1% and 5%, respectively. Standard errors are reported between brackets. 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: ΔCDS(t) Baseline N = 1 month N = 2 months N = 3 months N = 4 months
0.028* 0.003 0.005 0.012 0.019
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.003 0.032 0.022 0.013 0.006
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.017** 0.020** 0.020** 0.017** 0.018**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.203 -0.132 -0.13 -0.137 -0.144
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,767 3,767 3,767 3,767 3,767
Number of companies 17 17 17 17 17
Adj. R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Short positions (t-1), large banks during last N months before ban
Short positions (t-1), total sample
Short positions (t-1), non-financials during last N months before 
ban
Short positions (t-1), medium-sized banks during last N months 
before ban
 41 
 
Table 3: Effect of short positions on the default probabilities and implied ratings of Spanish listed 
companies before the inception of the ban 
This table reports the effects of the short positions in the Spanish listed companies on the changes in their default 
probabilities and implied ratings distinguishing the type of firm (medium-sized banks, large banks and non-
financials) before the inception of the ban (1 March 2011–11 August 2011). The coefficients for the effects of the 
volume of short positions and the additional controls are estimated on the basis of a fixed effects regression with the 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within panel correlation. The first column reports the effect of short 
positions relative to capital and their incremental effect on the first differences of the logit transformed default 
probabilities for all the firms with available information, before the ban for the following four groups of institutions: 
medium-sized banks, large banks, other financials and non-financials. The second, third and fourth columns report 
the differential effects on the first difference of the implied rating and two variations of the implied ratings before the 
ban for these four types of institutions. All the variables are defined in percentages with the exception of the debt 
purchased by the ECB, which is defined in billions of euros. ** and * indicate whether the coefficients are significant 
at a significance level of 1% and 5%, respectively. Standard errors are reported between brackets. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.071 0.295 0.337 1.026
(0.26) 0.338 (0.59) (1.33)
0.010 0.324 0.431 0.987
(0.16) (0.17) (0.22) (0.56)
0.254** 0.589* 1.194* 2.903*
(0.07) (0.25) (0.50) (1.18)
2.519 -1.383 -1.641 -4.686
(7.14) (2.57) (4.10) (9.22)
0.628** 1.592** 3.296** 6.372**
(0.15) (0.21) (0.41) (0.82)
-0.222** -0.258** -0.258** -0.250**
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
0.181** 0.508** 0.806** 1.850**
(0.03) (0.08) (0.13) (0.33)
1.647** 3.198* 6.132** 13.910**
(0.50) (1.23) (2.16) (5.12)
4.41E-06 -5.61E-06 -3.97E-06 -2.34E-05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.003 0.003 0.006 0.013
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 24,037 23,999 23,999 23,999
Number of companies 105 105 105 105
Adj. Rsquared 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06
Short positions (t-1), total sample
Short positions (t-1), non-financials before 
ban
Short positions (t-1), medium-sized banks 
before ban
Short positions (t-1), other financials 
before ban
Dep. var. 
Δlogit 
transformed 
PD
Dep. var. Δimplied ratings(t)
Constant
ΔVIX (t-1)
ΔSpanish sovereign CDS (t-1)
ECB Bond purchases since 8 August 2011
Short positions (t-1), large banks before 
ban
ΔDependent variable (t-1)
 42 
Table 4: Effects of the ban on CDS spreads and sovereign-corporate credit risk contagion 
This table reports the estimation of the effects of the ban on the variations in the sovereign-
corporate credit risk contagion indicator for the three firm groups (large banks, medium-banks, 
and non-financial companies). The estimations exploit data from a three-month period centred 
at the time of the ban. The estimated parameters are shown in Panel A. The dependent variable 
of the regression corresponding to column 1 is the first difference in the contagion indicators 
(in percentages). Column 2 contains the results obtained when the dependent variable is the 
first difference of CDS spreads. The explanatory variables are the same in the two columns: 
three dummies for the type of firm that take the value of one during the post-ban period and 
zero before. The estimates are obtained using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust 
standard errors and including fixed effects for each firm and day effects. Panel B reports the 
estimated difference for the coefficients reported in each column of panel A and whether the 
incremental effects of the ban for the three types of institutions are significantly different from 
zero. The null hypothesis to test in Panel B is whether the effect of the ban obtained for the first 
firm in each cell in the first column is significantly stronger (more negative coefficient) than 
the effect for the second firm. ** and * indicate whether the coefficients are significant at a 
significance level of 1% and 5%, respectively. Standard errors in Panel A and p-values in Panel 
B are reported between brackets. 
 
 
Panel A
ΔSovereign 
Credit Risk 
Spillovers (%)
Δ CDS 
Premium 
(basis points)
 -1.498*  -9.750*
(0.76) (4.91)
-0.485 -1.999
(0.45) (3.05)
0.479 -2.103
(0.33) (3.21)
0.037 5.762**
-0.314 (2.08)
Fixed effects YES YES
Time effects YES YES
Observations
1,278 1,216
Number of companies
18 18
Adj. R-squared 0.01 0.02
Panel B
Diff of coefficients
H0 (Diff of 
coeff <= 0 )
H0 (Diff of 
coeff <= 0 )
 -1.013*  -7.751*
(0.05) (0.03)
 -1.976**  -7.647*
(0.01) (0.02)
 -0.964* 0.104
(0.02) (0.52)
Δ CDS 
Premium 
(basis points)
Medium-sized banks - Big-sized banks
Medium-sized banks - Non-financial 
corporations
Big-sized banks - Non-financial 
corporations
Dummy medium-sized banks after ban
Dummy large banks after ban
Dummy non-financials after ban
Constant
Δ Sovereign 
Credit Risk 
Spillovers (%)
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Table 5: Effects of the ban on the volatility, liquidity, volume and returns of the shares of large banks, medium-sized banks and non-financial firms 
This table reports the estimated effects of the ban on the stock’s returns, volatility, liquidity and volume for three different types of Ibex 35 firms (large banks, 
medium-sized banks and non-financials). The coefficients of the estimation are shown in panel A. The dependent variable in column 1 is the firm’s daily 
stock returns. Column 2 contains the results obtained when the dependent variable is the realised volatility of the stock prices that is proxied by means of the 
square of the firm’s stock returns. The dependent variable of the regression corresponding to column 3 (liquidity) is the relative bid-ask spread. Column 4 
contains the results obtained when the dependent variable is the trading volume normalised to 100 at the time of the inception of the ban for all the firms in 
the sample. The explanatory variables are the same in the four columns: three dummies for the different types of firms that take the value of one during the 
post-ban period (one month and a half after the ban) and zero before. The estimates are obtained using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust standard 
errors and including fixed effects for each firm and day effects. Panel B of table 4 reports the difference for the coefficients reported in panel A and whether 
the incremental effects of the ban for the three types of institutions are significantly different from zero. The null hypothesis to test in panel B in the case of 
the volatility and volume (returns and relative bid-ask spreads) is whether the effect of the ban obtained for the first firm in each cell of the first column is 
significantly higher (lower) than the effect for the second firm. ** and * indicate whether the coefficients are significant at a significance level of 1% and 5%, 
respectively. Standard errors in panel A and p-values in panel B are reported between brackets. 
 
 
 
Panel A Returns Squared returns Relative bid-ask Volume (1 = date of ban)
0.01559**  -0.00058** 0.00165** -1.06664**
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.170)
0.01786** -0.00014 0.00014 -0.49044**
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.048)
0.01486** -0.00033** 0.00041* -0.40786**
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041)
0.03920** -0.00174** 0.00066 -0.43146*
(0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.172)
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 2308 2308 2308 2308
Number of companies 35 35 35 35
Adj. R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.06
Constant
Dummy medium-sized banks after 
ban
Dummy large banks after ban
Dummy non-financials after ban
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Panel B Returns Squared returns Relative bid-ask Volume (1 = date of ban)
Diff of coefficients H0 (Diff of coeff <= 0 ) H0 (Diff of coeff >= 0 ) H0 (Diff of coeff <= 0 ) H0 (Diff of coeff >= 0 )
-0.00227  -0.00044* 0.00151**  -0.57620**
(0.649) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000)
0.00073  -0.00025** 0.00124**  -0.65878**
(0.386) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
0.00300 0.00019 -0.00027  -0.08258**
(0.299) (0.802) (0.995) (0.008)
Large banks - Non-financials
Medium-sized banks - Large banks
Medium-sized banks - Non-
financials
